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Statistical mechanics of human resource
allocation: A mathematical modeling of
job-matching in labor markets
Jun-ichi Inoue and He Chen
Abstract We provide a mathematical model to investigate the human resource al-
location problem for agents, say, university graduates who are looking for their po-
sitions in labor markets. The basic model is described by the so-called Potts spin
glass which is well-known in the research field of statistical physics. In the model,
each Potts spin (a tiny magnet in atomic scale length) represents the action of each
student, and it takes a discrete variable corresponding to the company he/she applies
for. We construct the energy to include three distinct effects on the students’ behav-
ior, namely, collective effect, market history and international ranking of companies.
In this model system, the correlations (the adjacent matrix) between students are
taken into account through the pairwise spin-spin interactions. We carry out com-
puter simulations to examine the efficiency of the model. We also show that some
chiral representation of the Potts spin enables us to obtain some analytical insights
into our labor markets.
1 Introduction
Apparently, humans (or labors) are the most important resources in our society. This
is because they can produce not only various products and services in the society
but also they contribute to the society by paying their taxes. For this reason, in
each scale of society, say, from nation to companies or much smaller communities
such as laboratory (or research group) of university, allocation of human resources
is one of the essential problems. Needless to say, such appropriate allocation of
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human resource is regarded as a ‘matching problem’ between individuals and some
‘groups’ such as companies, and the difference among individuals in their abilities
or preference makes the problem difficult.
A typical example of the human resource allocation is found in simultaneous re-
cruiting of new graduates in Japan. Students who are looking for their jobs might
research several candidates of companies to enter and send the application letter
through the web site (what we call ‘entry sheet’). However, the students incline to
apply to well-established companies, whereas they do not like to get a job in rela-
tively small companies. This fact enhances the so-called ‘mismatch’ between labors
(students) and companies. We can easily see the situation of job-searching process in
Japan. At the job fair, we find that some booths could collect a lot of students (they
are all wearing a dark suit even in midsummer!). On the other hand, some other
booths could not attract the students’ attentions. Therefore, the job-matching itself
is apparently governed by some ‘collective behavior’ of students. Namely, each stu-
dent seems to behave by looking at their ‘neighbors’ and adapting to the ‘mood’
in their community, or they sometimes can share the useful information (of course,
such information is sometimes extremely ‘biased’) about the market via Internet or
social networking service.
In macroeconomics, there already exist a lot of effective attempts to discuss the
macroscopic properties [1, 2, 4, 3, 5] including so-called search theory [6, 7, 8, 9].
However, apparently, the macroscopic approaches lack of their microscopic view
points, namely, in their arguments, the behavior of microscopic heterogeneous
agents such as labors or companies are neglected.
To investigate the collective effects on the job-matching process from the mi-
croscopic view point, we have proposed several models and carried out computer
simulations [10, 11, 12] by considering some ‘aggregate data set’ for the labor mar-
ket.
In our previous successive studies [10, 11, 12], we succeeded in evaluating the
macroscopic quantities such as unemployment rate U and labor shortage ratio Ω
from the microscopic view point. However, these our studies depend on numerical
(computer) simulations for relatively small system size to calculate these quantities,
and we definitely need some mathematically rigorous approaches to find the univer-
sal fact underlying in the job-matching process of labor markets. It is also important
issue to be considered that we should take into account correlation between agents
(students) when we consider the job-matching process in realistic labor markets.
However, in our previous studies [10, 11, 12], we have neglected the correlation in
our modeling.
Motivated by the above background and requirement, here we propose a mathe-
matical toy model to investigate the job-matching process in Japanese labor markets
for university graduates and investigate the behavior analytically. Here we show our
preliminary limited results for the typical behavior of the market.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review our previous
study on the urn model with disorder [13] and several remarkable properties of the
model such as Bose-Einstein condensation. We also mention that the urn model
cannot take into account the interactions between agents. In section 3, we introduce
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our toy model, the so-called Potts model, and explain several macroscopic quan-
tities. Our preliminary results for several job-searching and selection scenarios by
students and companies are shown in section 4. The last section 5 is summary and
discussion.
2 Urn models and Bose condensation: A short review
As a candidate of describing the resource allocation problem, we might use the
urn models. In this model, one can show that a sort of Bose condensation takes
place. Hence, here we introduce the urn model with a disorder and explain several
macroscopic properties according to the reference [13].
We first introduce the Boltzmann weight for the system as
p(εi,ni) =
{
exp[−β E(εi,ni)]
ni! (Each ball is distinguishable)
exp[−β E(εi,ni)] (Each ball is NOT distinguishable) (1)
where β stands for the inverse temperature. The former is called Ehrenfest class,
whereas the latter is referred to as Monkey class.
E(εi,ni) denotes the energy function for the urn i possessing a disorder εi and ni
balls. Obviously, in the system with E(εi,ni) ∝ ni(> 0), each urn (agent) is affected
by attractive forces and they attempt to gather the balls (resources), whereas in the
system of E(εi,ni) ∝ −ni, each urn is affected by repulsive force and they refuse
to collect the balls. The job-matching process in labor market is well-described by
the former case. On the other hand, the problem of spent-nuclear-fuel reprocessing
plant in Japan is a good example to consider by using the latter case, namely, balls
are ‘wastes’ and urns are ‘prefectures’.
In the thermodynamic limit: N,M → ∞,M/N = ρ = O(1), the averaged occupa-
tion probability P(k), which is a probability that an arbitrary urn possesses k balls is
given by
ρ =
〈∑∞n=0 nφE,µ,β (ε,n)
∑∞n=0 φE,µ,β (ε,n)
〉
, P(k) =
〈φE,µ,β (ε,k)
∑∞n=0 φE,µ,β
〉
, zs = exp(β µ)
where zs is a solution of the saddle point equation (S.P.E.) and we defined
φE,µ,β (ε,n) =
{
exp[−β (E(ε,n)−nµ)]
n! (Ehrenfest class)
exp[−β (E(ε,n)− nµ)] (Monkey class) (2)
In following, we consider the case of Monkey class with the cost function:
E(ε,n) = εn, (3)
which leads to the Boltzmann weight:
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φE,µ,β (ε,n) = exp[−β n(ε− µ)]. (4)
We choose the distribution of disorder: D(ε) = ε0εα . Then, the saddle point equa-
tion is given by
ρ =
∫
∞
0
ε0εα dε
z−1s exp(β ε)− 1 +ρε=0 (5)
where we should notice that ρε=0 is negligibly small before condensation. We in-
crease the density ρ keeping the temperature β−1 constant. Then, the possible sce-
nario is shown in Table 1. It should be noted that we defined the critical density
density of balls Solution of S.P.E. # of condensation / # of non-condensation
ρ < ρc zs < 1 0/Nρ
ρ = ρc zs = 1 0/Nρc
ρ > ρc zs = 1 N(ρ −ρc)/Nρc
Table 1 The possible scenario of Bose condensation controlled by the density ρ .
as
ρc =
∫
∞
0
ε0εα dε
exp(β ε)− 1 (6)
After simple algebra, we have
P(k) = z
k
s ε0Γ (3/2)
β 3/2 k
−3/2−
zk+1s ε0Γ (3/2)
β 3/2 (k+ 1)
−3/2 (7)
for α = 1/2. We show the P(k) for several values of zs in Fig. 1. From this figure, we
find that before condensation, namely, for zs < 1,ρ < ρc, the occupation probability
is given by
P(k) = (1− zs)ε0β 3/2 k
−3/2e−k log(1/zs) (8)
On the other hand, after condensation, that is, for zs = 1,ρ ≥ ρc, we have
P(k) = 3ε0Γ (3/2)
2β 3/2 k
−5/2 +
1
N
δ (k− k∗) (9)
The important remarks here are the fact that the condensation is specified by the
power-law behavior of the occupation probability and for the case of without disor-
der, namely, for D(ε) = δ (ε − ε0), the power-law behavior disappears.
As we saw, the urn model with disorder exhibits a rich physical phenomena such
as condensation, however, there is no explicit interaction between agents (balls and
urns). Actually, when we consider the job-matching process, it is impossible to ac-
cept the assumption that there is no correlation between urns (companies), balls
(students), or between urns and balls. Hence, we should use a different description
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Fig. 1 The occupation probability of the Monkey class urn model with disorder. This figure was
taken from our previous paper [13].
of the system. In the next section, we use the so-called Potts model to describe the
problem of human resource allocation.
3 Correlations: The Potts model descriptions
The basic model proposed here for this purpose is described by the so-called Potts
spin glass model which is well-known in the research field of statistical physics.
In the model, each Potts spin represents the action of each student, and it takes a
discrete value (integer) corresponding to the company he/she applies for. The pair-
wise interaction term in the energy function describes cross-correlations between
students, and it makes our previous model [10, 11, 12] more realistic. Obviously,
labor science deals with empirical evidence in labor markets and it is important for
us to look for the so-called ‘stylized facts’ which have been discussed mainly in
financial markets [14, 15]. We also should reproduce the findings from data-driven
models to forecast the market’s behavior.
In following, we show the limited results. Here we consider the system of labor
market having N students and K companies. To make the problem mathematically
tractable, we construct the energy (Hamiltonian) to include three distinct effects on
the students’ behavior:
H(σ t) =−
J
N ∑i j ci j δσ (t)i ,σ (t)j − γ
N
∑
i=1
K−1
∑
k=0
εk δk,σ (t)i
+
N
∑
i=1
K−1
∑
k=0
βk |v∗k − vk(t− 1)|δk,σ (t)i ,
(10)
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where δa,b denotes a Kronecker’s delta and a Potts spin σ (t)i stands for the company
which student i post his application letter to at stage (or time) t, namely,
σ
(t)
i ∈ {0, · · · ,K− 1}, i = 1, · · · ,N. (11)
Therefore, the first term in the above equation (10) denotes a collective effect, the
second corresponds to the ranking of companies and the third term is a market his-
tory. In order to include the cross-correlations between students, we describe the
system by using the Potts spin glass (see the ‘quenched’ random variables ci j in
(10)) as a generalization of the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model, which is well-known
as an exactly solvable model for spin glass so far. The overall energy function of
probabilistic labor market is written explicitly by (10). ci j is an adjacency matrix
standing for the ‘interpersonal relationship’ of students, and one can choose an ar-
bitrary form, say
ci j =


c (students i, j are ‘friendly’)
0 (students i, j are ‘independent’)
−c (students i, j are ‘anti-friendly’)
(12)
for c > 0 and the ranking of the company k is defined by εk (see e.g. [11] for the
detail).
Before investigating some specific cases below, we shall first provide a general
setup. Let us introduce a microscopic variable, which represents the decision making
of companies for a student as
ξ (t)i =
{
1 (student i receives an acceptance at stage t)
0 (student i is rejected at stage t) (13)
Then, the conditional probability is given by
P(ξ (t)i |σ (t)i ) = 1−A(σ (t)i )− (1− 2A(σ (t)i ))ξ (t)i (14)
with the acceptance ratio
A(σ (t)i )≡
K−1
∑
k=0
δk,σ (t)i Θ(v
∗
k − vk(t))+
K−1
∑
k=0
δk,σ (t)i
v∗k
vk(t)
Θ(vk(t)− v∗k), (15)
where v∗k(= 1/K, for simplicity in this paper) and vk(t) denote the quota and actual
number of applicants to the company k per student at stage t, respectively. Θ(· · ·) is
a conventional step function. Hence, when we assume that selecting procedure by
companies is independent of students, we immediately have
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P(ξ t |σ t) =
N
∏
i=1
P(ξ (t)1 |σ (t)1 ) · · ·P(ξ (t)N |σ (t)N )
= exp
[
N
∑
i=1
log
{
1−A(σ (t)i )− (1− 2A(σ
(t)
i ))ξi
}]
. (16)
Thus, we calculate the joint probability P(ξ t ,σ t) by means of P(ξ t |σ t)P(σ t) as
P(ξ t ,σ t) = P(ξ t |σ t)P(σ t)
=
exp
[
∑Ni=1 log
{
1−A(σ (t)i )− (1− 2A(σ
(t)
i ))ξ (t)i
}
−H(σ t)
]
∑ξ t ,σ t exp
[
∑Ni=1 log
{
1−A(s(t)i )− (1− 2A(s
(t)
i ))ξ (t)i
}
−H(σ t)
]
(17)
where we assumed that the P(σ t) obeys a Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution for the
energy function (10) as ∼ e−H(σ t).
Therefore, the employment rate as a macroscopic quantity:
1−U(t) = 1
N
N
∑
i=1
ξ (t)i (18)
is evaluated as an average over the joint probability P(ξ t ,σ t), and in the thermody-
namic limit N → ∞, it leads to
1−U(t) =
∑ξ t ,σ t ξi exp
[
∑Ni=1 log
{
1−A(σ (t)i )− (1− 2A(σ
(t)
i ))ξ (t)i
}
−H(σ t)
]
∑ξ t ,σ t exp
[
∑Ni=1 log
{
1−A(σ (t)i )− (1− 2A(σ
(t)
i ))ξ (t)i
}
−H(σ t)
]
=
∑σ t A(σ (t)i )exp[−H(σ t)]
∑σ t exp[−H(σ t)]
≡ 〈A(σ (t)i )〉, (19)
where we defined the bracket:
〈· · · 〉 ≡
∑σ t (· · ·)exp[−H(σ t)]
∑σ t exp[−H(σ t)]
. (20)
From the resulting expression (20), we are confirmed that the employment rate 1−
U(t) is given by an average of the acceptance ratio (15) over the Gibbs-Boltzmann
distribution for the energy function (10). Using the above general formula, we shall
calculate the employment rate exactly for several limited cases.
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4 The results
In following, we show our several limited contributions. Before we show our main
result, we shall give a relationship between the Potts modeling and our previous
studies [10, 11, 12] which are obtained by simply setting J = 0 in (10).
4.1 For the case of J = 0
We first consider the case of J = 0. For this case, the energy function (10) is com-
pletely ‘decoupled’ as follows.
H(σ t) = ∑
i
Hi, (21)
Hi = −
K−1
∑
k=0
{γεk−β |v∗k − vk(t− 1)|}δσ (t)i ,k (22)
where we set βk = β (∀k) for simplicity. Hence, the vk(t) is evaluated in terms of the
definition (20) as
vk(t)≡ limN→∞
1
N
N
∑
i=1
δ
σ
(t)
i ,k
=
〈
δ
σ
(t)
i ,k
〉
=
exp[−γεk +β |v∗k − vk(t− 1)|]
∑K−1k=0 exp[−γεk +β |v∗k − vk(t− 1)|]
(23)
and from the expression of employment rate (19), we have
1−U(t)=
∑K−1k=0
{
v∗k
vk(t)
+
(
1− v
∗
k
vk(t)
)
Θ(v∗k − vk(t))
}
exp[−γεk +β |v∗k − vk(t− 1)|]
∑K−1k=0 exp[−γεk +β |v∗k − vk(t− 1)|]
.
(24)
By solving the non-linear equation (23) recursively and substituting the solution
vk(t) into (24), we obtain the time-dependence of the employment rate 1−U(t). In
Fig. 2, we plot the time-dependence of the employment rate for the case of K = 3
(left) and the γ-dependence of the employment rate at the steady state at t = 10 for
K = 3 and K = 50 (right). We set the job-offer ratio defined in [10, 11, 12] as α = 1.
The ranking factor is also selected by
εk = 1+
k
K
. (25)
We here assumed that each agent posts only a single application letter to the mar-
ket, namely, a = 1 in the definition of the previous studies [10, 11, 12]. It should be
important for us to remind that the above equation (23) is exactly the same as the up-
date rule for the aggregation probability Pk(t) in the reference [10]. However, when
we restrict ourselves to the case of α = a = 1, one can obtain the time-dependence
of the employment rate exactly by (24). This is an advantage of this approach. It
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also should be noted that from the relationship:
U = αΩ + 1−α (26)
(see [10] for the derivation), we have U = Ω , namely, the unemployment rate is
exactly the same as the labor shortage ratio for α = 1.
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Fig. 2 The time-dependence of the employment rate for the case of K = 3 (left) and the γ-
dependence of the employment rate at the steady state at t = 10 for K = 3 and K = 50 (right).
We set the job-offer ratio defined in [10, 11, 12] as α = 1 and assume that each agent posts only
a single application letter to the market, namely, a = 1 in the definition of the previous studies
[10, 11, 12].
It is important for us to notice that the aggregation probability of the system
P(σ t) is rewritten in terms of Pk(t) in the references [10, 11, 12] as
P(σ t) =
{
K
∏
k=1
Pk(t)
}N
(27)
with Pk(t) = vk(t) (see (23)) even for α 6= 1. For this case, the system parameters
are only γ and β , and these unknown parameters are easily calibrated from the
empirical data [12]. As the result, we obtained U-Ω curve using (26) for the past 17
years in Japanese labor market for university graduates. We plot the resulting and
U-Ω curve in Fig. 3. The gap between the theoretical and empirical curves comes
from the uncertainties in the calibration of average number of application letters a.
In this figure, we simply chose the value as a = 10 in our calculations.
4.2 The case of J 6= 0
We next consider the case of J 6= 0. Then, we should note that some ‘chiral rep-
resentation’ of the energy function (10) by means of the chiral Potts spin [16, 17]
(Note: ‘i’ appearing in ‘2pi i’ below is an imaginary unit):
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Fig. 3 The empirical and theoretical U-Ω curves. We clearly find that the large γ apparently pushes
the U-Ω curve toward the upper right direction where the global mismatch between the students
and companies is large. The picture was taken from our previous study [12].
λi = exp
(
2pi i
K
σ
(t)
i
)
, σ
(t)
i = 0, · · · ,K− 1 (28)
enables us to obtain some analytical insights into our labor markets.
4.2.1 The case of γ = β = 0: Without ranking and market history
As a preliminary, we show the employment rate 1−U as a function of J(> 0) for
the simplest case γ = β = 0 and ci j = 1(∀i j) in Fig. 4 (right), and the actual number
of applicants the company k obtains in Fig. 4 (left). We should keep in mind that for
this simplest case with local energy
Hi j ≡−Jδσi,σ j =−
J
K
K−1
∑
r=0
λ ri λ K−rj =−
J
K
{
1+
K−1
∑
r=1
λ ri λ K−rj
}
(29)
under the transformation (28) leading to the total energy H(σ )≡ ∑i j Hi j, by evalu-
ating the partition function:
Z = ∑
σ
exp
[
J
NK
K−1
∑
r=1
∑
i j
cos
2pir(σi−σ j)
K
]
(30)
in the limit of N →∞, one can obtain the employment rate 1−U = 〈A(σ )〉 (see also
equation (19)) exactly as
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1−U = ∑σ A(σ )exp[−H(σ )]∑σ exp[−H(σ )]
=
{
v∗0
v0
+
(
1− v
∗
0
v0
)
Θ(v∗0− v0)
}
1+(K− 1)e−
Jx
K−1
+
(K− 1)
{
v∗k
vk
+
(
1− v
∗
k
vk
)
Θ(v∗k − vk)
}
e−
Jx
K−1
1+(K− 1)e−
Jx
K−1
(31)
with
vk ≡ limN→∞
1
N
N
∑
i=1
δσi,k =
〈
δσ ,k
〉
=
δ0,k +∑K−1σ=1 δσ ,k e−
Jx
K−1
1+(K− 1)e−
Jx
K−1
, k = 0, · · · ,K− 1, (32)
where an order parameter x is determined as a solution of the following non-linear
equation:
x = (K− 1)
(
1− e−
J
K−1 x
1+(K− 1)e−
J
K−1 x
)
. (33)
It should be noted that the above x is given by the extremum of the free energy
density:
f =− Jx
2
K(K− 1)
+ log
K−1
∑
σ=0
exp
[
Jx
K(K− 1)
K−1
∑
r=1
cos
(
2pir
K
σ
)]
. (34)
The acceptance ratio A(σ ) is now given by
A(σ )≡
N
∑
i=1
A(σi) =
N
∑
i=1
K−1
∑
k=0
δσi,k
{
v∗k
vk
+
(
1−
v∗k
vk
)
Θ(v∗k − vk)
}
, (35)
and we omitted the time t-dependence in the above expressions because the system
is no longer dependent on the market history, namely vk(t − 1), for the choice of
β = γ = 0 in the energy function (10).
In Fig. 4, we easily find that phase transitions take place when the strength of
‘cooperation’ J increases beyond the critical point Jc. Namely, for weak J regime,
‘random search’ by students is a good strategy to realize the perfect employment
state (1−U = 1), however, once J increases beyond the critical point, the perfect
state is no longer stable and system suddenly goes into the extremely worse employ-
ment phase for K ≥ 3 (first order phase transition). The critical point of the second
order phase transition for K = 2 is easily obtained by expanding (33) around x = 0
as
x =
1− e−Jx
1+ e−Jx
≃ Jx/2 (36)
and this reads Jc = 2. For the first order phase transition, we numerically obtain the
critical values, for instance, we have Jc = 2.73 for K = 3 and Jc = 3.21 for K = 4. As
the number K is quite large far beyond K = 3 in real labor markets, hence the above
finding for the discontinuous transition might be useful for discussing a mismatch
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between students and companies, which is a serious issue in recent Japanese labor
markets (see the reference [12]).
We also carried out computer simulations to examine the efficiency of the model.
We should mention that the analytic results (lines) and the corresponding Monte
Carlo simulations (dots) with finite system size N = 1000 are in an excellent agree-
ment in the figures. This preliminary result is a justification for us to conform that
one can make a mathematically rigorous platform to investigate the labor market
along this direction.
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Fig. 4 The actual number of applicants vk (left) and employment rate 1−U (right) as a function
of the strength of cooperation J. We find that the system undergoes a phase transition at the critical
point. The transition is the second order for K = 2, whereas it is the first order for K ≥ 3. These
critical points are given by Jc = 2 for K = 2, Jc = 2.73 for K = 3 and Jc = 3.21 for K = 4. We should
mention that the analytic results (lines) and the corresponding Monte Carlo simulations (MCMC)
with the finite number of students N = 1000 (dots) are in an excellent agreement. We should
notice that perfect employment phase is a ‘disordered phase’, whereas the poor employment phase
corresponds to an ‘ordered phase’ in the literature of order-disorder phase transition. For large
strength of cooperation J, as a company occupies all applications up to the quota, limJ→∞(1−U) =
v∗k = 1/K (the quota per student) is satisfied.
We next consider the case of β ,γ 6= 0.
4.2.2 Ranking effects
For the case of γ 6= 0,βk = 0(∀k), the saddle point equation is given by the following
two-dimensional vector form:
(xr,yr) = 〈ur(s)〉∗ =
(〈
cos
2pir
K
s
〉
∗
,
〈
sin 2pir
K
s
〉
∗
)
, r = 0, · · · ,K− 1 (37)
where we defined the bracket 〈· · · 〉∗ as
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〈· · · 〉∗ ≡
∑K−1s=0 (· · · )exp[ψr(s : {xr},{yr})]
∑K−1s=0 exp[ψr(s : {xr},{yr})]
, (38)
ψr(s : {xr},{yr})≡
K−1
∑
r=0
X r ·ur(s) (39)
with the following two vectors:
X r =
(
J
K
xr +
γ
K
K−1
∑
k=0
εk cos
2pir
K
k, J
K
yr +
γ
K
K−1
∑
k=0
εk sin
2pir
K
k
)
(40)
ur(s) =
(
cos
2pir
K
s,sin 2pir
K
s
)
. (41)
From the energy function (10) and the above formula, we should notice that the
ranking factor εk is regarded as a ‘state-dependent field’ affecting each spin and the
symmetry in the ‘perfect employment phase’ for small J (see Fig. 4 (right)) might
be broken by these unbiased effects. We also should keep in mind that for the case
of γ = 0 or εk = ε (∀k), we find that the equation (37) possesses the solution of
the type: x0, · · · ,xK−1 6= 0, y0 = · · · = yK−1 = 0. It should be also bear in mind that
K = 2 is rather a special case and the solution of the above type is obtained simply
as
x0 = 1, x ≡ x1 =
1− e−Jx+γ(ε1−ε0)
1+ e−Jx+γ(ε1−ε0)
, y0 = y1 = 0. (42)
However, for general case, we must deal with two-dimensional vectors (xr,yy), r =
0, · · · ,K − 1 with each non-zero component xr,yr 6= 0 to specify the equilibrium
properties of the system.
For the solution (xr,yr), r = 0, · · · ,K − 1, we obtain the order parameters and
employment rate as
vr = 〈δr,s〉∗ (43)
1−U = 〈A(s)〉∗, r = 0, · · · ,K− 1. (44)
In Fig. 5, we plot the J-dependence of the employment rate for K = 2 (left) and
K = 3 (right). From this figure, we find that the employment rate decreases mono-
tonically, however, within intermediate range of J, the 1−U behaves discontinu-
ously. We should notice that in this regime, the ‘ergodicity’ of the system might be
broken because the realized value of 1−U by Monte Carlo simulation is strongly
dependent on the choice of initial configuration (pattern) of Potts spins.
To see the result more explicitly, we should draw our attention to the initial con-
dition dependence of the J-(1−U) curve. Actually, here we carry out Monte Carlo
simulation to examine the initial configuration dependence of the 1−U numerically
and show the results in Fig. 6. From this figure, we confirm that the value of the
1−U depends on the initial configuration of the Potts spins although the 1−U is
independent of the initial condition for J < 3 and J ≫ 1. In this plot, we chose the
two distinct initial conditions so as to make the gap of order parameters O(1) object,
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Fig. 5 The strength of cooperation J-dependence of the employment rate for the case of γ 6= 0,βk =
0(∀k). We plot the case of K = 2 (left) and K = 3 (right). We find that the phase transition as shown
in Fig. 4 disappears, however, the ergodicity breaking phase appears within intermediate range of
J. We are conformed that limJ→∞(1−U) = 1/K is satisfied even for this case. The simulations
(MCMC) are carried out for the system of size N = 1000.
that is,
∆xr(≡ x(a)r − x(b)r ),∆yr(≡ y(a)r − y(b)r )∼ O(1) (45)
for r = 0, · · · ,K− 1.
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 0.6
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 0.8
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1-U
J
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Fig. 6 The initial configuration dependence of the 1−U . We set K = 3,γ = 1.1 and choose
three distinct initial configurations for Monte Carlo simulations. We find that 1−U is strongly
dependent on the initial condition (‘pattern 1 ∼ 3’) within intermediate range of J. In this
plot, we chose the two distinct initial conditions so as to make the gap of order parameters
O(1) object, that is, ∆xr(≡ x(a)r − x(b)r ),∆yr(≡ y(a)r − y(b)r ) ∼ O(1) for r = 0, · · · ,K − 1 (a,b =
{pattern 1,pattern 2, pattern 3}).
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It might be important for us to investigate the basin of attraction for the matching
dynamics analytically as in the reference [18], however, it is far beyond the scope
of the current paper and it should be addressed our future study.
4.2.3 Market history effects
We next consider the case of βk 6= 0(∀k). For this case, we should replace the X r in
the saddle point equation (37) by
X r =
(
J
K
xr +
1
K
K−1
∑
k=0
(γεk −βk|v∗k − vk(t− 1)|)cos 2pirK k,
J
K
yr +
1
K
K−1
∑
k=0
(γεk−βk|v∗k − vk(t− 1)|)sin 2pirK k
)
. (46)
It should be noticed that the vk at the previous stage t−1 is regarded as an ‘external
field’ which affects the spin system at the current stage t. Hence, by substituting
vk(0) as an initial state into the equation (37) with (46), we can solve the equation
with respect to vk(1). By repeating the procedures, we obtain the ‘time series’ as
vk(0)→ vk(1)→···vk(t)→ for all k and 1−U(t) as a function of t. In Fig. 7, we plot
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Fig. 7 The time (stage) dependence of the employment rate 1−U for the case of K = 2,J =
1,γ = 0.1 and (β1,β0) = (1,4) (left) and (β1,β0) = (4,1) (right). The ‘zigzag behavior’ in vk(t) is
observed for (β1,β0) = (4,1).
the time (stage) dependence of the employment rate 1−U for the case of K = 2,J =
1,γ = 0.1 and (β1,β0) = (1,4) (left) and (β1,β0) = (4,1) (right). From this figure,
we find that the larger weight of the market history effect for the highest ranking
company β1 in comparison with β0 induces the periodical change of the order for
v1,v0 due to the negative feedback (a sort of ‘minority game’ [19] for the students).
Namely, from the ranking gap ε1 − ε0 = 1/2 for K = 2, the company ‘1’ attracts
a lot of applications at time t even for a relatively small strength of the preference
γ = 0.1. However, at the next stage, the ability of the aggregation for the company
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‘1’ remarkably decreases due to the large β1. As the result, the inequality v1 > v0 is
reversed as v0 > v1, and the company ‘0’ obtains much more applications than the
company ‘1’ at this stage. After several time steps, the amount of β1|v∗1− v1(t− 1)|
becomes small enough to turn on the switch of the preference for the high ranking
company ‘1’, and eventually the inequality v1 > v0 should be recovered again. The
‘zigzag behavior’ due to the above feedback mechanism in vk(t) is actually observed
in Fig. 7 (right). On the other hand, when the strength of the history effect β0 for
the lower ranking company is larger than that of the higher ranking company β1, the
zigzag behavior disappears and v0,v1 converge monotonically to the steady states
reflecting the ranking ε0 < ε1.
5 Summary and discussion
In this paper, we proposed a mathematical toy model, the so-called chiral Potts
model to investigate the job-matching process in Japanese labor markets for univer-
sity graduates and investigated the behavior analytically. We found several charac-
teristic properties in the system. Let us summarize them below. For the case without
ranking effect and market history, we observed that the system undergoes fist order
phase transition for K ≥ 3 by changing the strength of cooperation J(> 0). When we
take into account the ranking effect without market history, the ergodicity breaking
region in J appears. The market history affects on the dynamics of actual number of
applicants to each company vk(t) to exhibit ‘zig-zag’ behavior.
We would like to stress that the situation and our modeling are applicable to the
other type of resource allocation (utilization) such as the so-called Kolkata Paise
Restaurant (KPR) problem [20].
5.1 Inverse problem of the Potts model
However, from the view point of empirical science, in this model system, the cross-
correlations (the adjacent matrix) between students and companies are unknown
and not yet specified. Hence, we should estimate these elements by using appro-
priate empirical data sets. For instance, if we obtain the ‘empirical correlation’
〈δσi,σ j 〉emprical from the data, we can determine ci j so as to satisfy the following
relationship:
〈δσi,σ j 〉 =
∂
∂ci j
log∑
σ
exp[−H(σ : {ci j})]
=
∑σ δσi,σ j exp[−H(σ : {ci j})]
∑σ exp[−H(σ : {ci j})]
= 〈δσi,σ j 〉emprical (47)
where 〈δσi,σ j 〉emprical might be evaluated empirically as a time-average by
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〈δσi,σ j 〉emprical = (1/τ)
τ+t0∑
t=t0
δ
σ
(t)
i ,σ
(t)
j
. (48)
We might also use the EM (Expectation and Maximization)-type algorithm [21] to
infer the interactions. Those extensive studies in this directions (the ‘inverse Potts
problem’) including collecting the empirical data are now working in progress.
5.2 Learning of valuation basis of companies
In this paper, we did not take into account the details of valuation process by compa-
nies so far. In our modeling, we assumed that they randomly select suitable students
from the candidates up to their quota. This is because the valuation basis is unfortu-
nately not opened for the public and it is somewhat ‘black box’ for students. How-
ever, recently, several web sites [22, 23] for supporting job hunting might collect a
huge number of information about students as their ‘scores’ of aptitude test.
Hence, we might have a N-dimensional vector, each of whose component repre-
sents a score for a given question, for each student l = 1, · · · ,L as
x(l) = (x
(l)
1 ,x
(l)
2 , · · · ,x
(l)
N ) (49)
Then, we assume that each company µ = 1, · · · ,K possesses their own valuation ba-
sis (weight) as a N-dimensional vector aµ = (aµ1, · · · ,aµN) and the score of student
l evaluated by the company µ = 1, · · · ,K is given by
y(l)µ = aµ1x
(l)
1 + aµ2x
(l)
2 + · · ·+ aµNx
(l)
N , µ = 1, · · · ,K. (50)
It is naturally accepted that the company µ selects the students who are the v∗µ -top
score candidates. Therefore, For a given threshold θµ , the decision by companies is
given by
yˆ(l)µ =Θ(y(l)µ −θµ) =
{
1 (accept)
0 (reject) (51)
where Θ(· · ·) is a unit step function.
Thus, for L students and K companies, the situation is determined by the follow-
ing linear equation:


y(l)1
·
·
·
y(l)M

=


a11 · · · · · · · · · a1N
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
aM1 · · · · · · · · · aMN




x
(l)
1
·
·
·
·
·
x
(l)
N


, l = 1, · · · ,L (52)
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namely,
y(l) = Ax(l), l = 1, · · · ,L. (53)
When we have enough number of data sets (y(l),x(l)), l = 1, · · · ,L, one might es-
timate the valuation base A by using suitable learning algorithm. When we notice
that the above problem is described by ‘learning of a linear perceptron’, one might
introduce the following cost function:
E =
1
2LM
L
∑
l=1
M
∑
µ=1
δ
s
(l)
µ ,1
{
y(l)µ −
N
∑
i=1
aµix
(l)
i
}2
(54)
where we defined δa,b as Kroneker’s delta and
s
(l)
µ =
{
1 (student l sends an application letter to company µ)
0 (otherwise) (55)
Then, we construct the learning equation as
daµk
dt =−η
∂E
∂aµk
=
η
LM
L
∑
l=1
δ
s
(l)
µ ,1
{
y(l)µ −
N
∑
i=1
aµix
(l)
i
}
x
(l)
k (56)
for µ = 1, · · · ,M,k = 1, · · · ,N.
We show an example of the learning dynamics through the error:
ε(t) =
1
NM
M
∑
µ=1
N
∑
k=1
(a∗µk− aµk(t))
2, (57)
where a∗µk denotes a ‘true weight’, for artificial data sets in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8 Time-dependence of error ε(t) = (1/NM)∑Mµ=1 ∑Nk=1(a∗µk −aµk(t))2 for the learning equa-
tion (56) using artificial data sets. We choose the learning rate as η = 0.01/ log(2+t). N =M = 10.
Here we showed just an example of learning from artificial data sets for demon-
stration, however, it should be addressed as our future work to apply the learning
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algorithm to realistic situation using empirical data set collected from [22, 23] or
large-scale survey.
Finally, it would be important for us to mention that it could be treated as ‘dic-
tionary learning’ [24] when the vector x(l), l = 1, · · · ,L is ‘sparse’ in the context of
compressive sensing [25, 26, 27].
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